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Viewing cable 07ROME710, ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE...

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, 
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR
 
 
REF: A. STATE 36991 
     ¶B. STATE 37005 
     ¶C. STATE 41871 
     ¶D. STATE 42573 
     ¶E. ROME 625 
     ¶F. ROME 702 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a 
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo 
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should 
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in 
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the 
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the 
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said 
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East 
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians 
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where 
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), 
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the 
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees 
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said 
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy 
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on 
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 
 
Afghanistan and Emergency Now 
----------------------------- 

¶2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister 
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. 
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino 
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was 
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the 
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for 
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an 
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked 
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. 
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him 
that if his employees are going to be arrested in 
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that 
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all 
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan 
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it 
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access 
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he 
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part 
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in 
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks 
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. 
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him 
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the 
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were 
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses 
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be 
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would 
not win this war. 
 
Kosovo - Firm Support for Status 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on  
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion 
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. 
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the 
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be 
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status 
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority 
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were 
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter 
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from 
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR 
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a 
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something 
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to 
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. 
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he 
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with 
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support 
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and 
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema 
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed 
to do so. 
 
Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance 
------------------------------------  

¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were 
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when 
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had 
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was 
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He 
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week 
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested 
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema 
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in 
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions 
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the 
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, 
despite being a UNSC member." 
 
Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent 
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept 
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would 
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of 
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than 
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his 
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed 
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would 
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence 
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing 
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting 
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security 
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would 
never accept an independent state within provisional borders, 
because they believe this means they will never get final 
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional 
final status conference, but not until the open final status 
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with 
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, 
the international community needed to step in and offer hope 
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians 
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated 
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians 
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. 
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status 
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome 
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very 
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. 
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not 
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy 
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or 
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in 
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would 
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He 
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or 
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for 
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo 
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of 
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea 
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could 
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in 
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the 
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on 
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters 
------------------------------ 

¶8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that 
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send 
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would 
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if 
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by 
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the 
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he 
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian 
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were 
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits 
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. 
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court 
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the 
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The 
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having 
extradition requests forwarded. 
SPOGLI

Fonte: http://www.wikileaks.ch

Viewing cable 07USNATO186, DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS...

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREF PTER PREL AF IT
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 36204 B. USNATO 183 

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Anticipating reftel A, Ambassador Nuland, 
during the March 21 North Atlantic Council meeting, joined 
the UK in criticizing the evident Taliban-for-hostage 
exchange in the release of kidnapped Italian journalist 
Mastrogiacomo.  She also raised the issue separately with SYG 
de Hoop Scheffer, who will address it with PermReps in a more 
restricted forum, but is leaning toward pushing for an 
Alliance-wide hostage policy.  USNATO believes NATO consensus 
on a common policy will be hard to achieve, but the subject 
is worth discussing to raise awareness.  END SUMMARY. 

¶2.  (C) During the March 21 NAC meeting, Ambassador Nuland 
reinforced criticism by the UK Charge and noted strongly the 
intrinsic dangers of bargaining with terrorists, plus concern 
for all Allies if the Taliban thought that hostage taking was 
a route to future prisoner exchanges (ref B).  She and the UK 
Charge also asked the Secretary General and Chairman of the 
Military Committee if ISAF had been consulted over the 
process of Mastrogiacomo's release.  Both committed to 
investigate.  The Italian Charge declined to comment on how 
the journalist was freed without more details from capital, 
but expressed the Italian government's gratitude to Karzai 
for his help. 
 
¶3.  (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer told PermReps during the March 
21 NAC that he intends to raise this issue at an informal 
lunch or coffee gathering of PermReps in the near future.  In 
a separate conversation with Ambassador Nuland, he said he is 
leaning toward pushing for an Alliance-wide hostage policy. 
 
¶4.  (C) COMMENT: Raising awareness on this issue among NATO 
Allies is important and necessary, with the goal of reaching 
agreed guidelines.  However, achieving consensus on a binding 
NATO hostage policy, similar to NSPD 12, for example, will be 
very difficult.  Few Allies are likely to want a discussion 
like this which they consider sovereign to be collectively 
decided.  END COMMENT. 
NULAND

Fonte: http://www.wikileaks.ch/