Poesia, Storia e Politica, il fascino del Potere...

domenica 5 dicembre 2010

SUBJECT: CUBAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL FLEE VENEZUELA!

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000442

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

EMBASSY BOGOTA FOR REF CORD (SHIGGINS)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

DEPARTMENT PASS TO G/TIP (BFLECK)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2034

TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KTIP VE CU

SUBJECT: CUBAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL FLEE VENEZUELA

CARACAS 00000442 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Fernandez,

Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Â¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Caracas notes a significant number

of Cuban medical personnel applying to be paroled into the

United States under the Significant Public Benefit Parole

(SPBP) for Cuban Medical Professionals outside of Cuba

(CMPP). During Consular Section interviews in March, Cuban

Medical personnel affiliated with Chavez's Barrio Adentro

program complained of poor working conditions, inadequate

medical supplies, and of constantly being watched and

monitored by coworkers. As result of the Government of the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV) clamp down on Cubans

attempting to flee the island through Venezuela, recent

asylum seekers have complained of having difficulty in

exiting Venezuela and being forced to pay exorbitant bribes

to GBRV officials when attempting to leave the country

en-route to Miami. End Summary.

-----------------------------

CUBANS DOCTORS FLEE VENEZUELA

-----------------------------

Â¶2. (S) The Consular Section at US Embassy Caracas began

accepting applications for SPBP on August 18, 2006. To date,

the Embassy has received paperwork and forwarded to the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applications for 739

Cuban asylum seekers, of which 69% or 510 were approved, 91

were denied and 138 are pending. Since February of 2009, DHS

has notified Post that 73 Cuban Medical Personnel Program

(CMPP) applicants have been approved for parole through the

CMPP.

Â¶3. (S) In 2006 and 2007 Embassy Caracas facilitated travel

to Miami for program applicants through the issuance of

transportation letters authorizing Cubans to board US bound

aircraft. By October 2007, Venezuelan immigration officials

began refusing to board defecting Cubans on onward flights to

Miami in an unpredictable and ad-hoc manner. To enhance

fraud protection due to insecurity of the travel letter, (one

letter was used by an imposture), Post sought and received CA

approval to issue YY visa foils instead of transportation

letters. Having a visa foil in their passports has

facilitated the departure of most parolees. The Consular

Section began issuing YY visa foils in February 2009 to

approved Cuban Medical Parolees. Of the 73 approved CMPP

applicants in 2009, 43 have been issued YY visa foils, 39

have successfully passed through immigration and boarded

their flight to Miami, and two have confirmed plans to travel

in the near future. Thirty approved applicants have not yet

confirmed travel plans because they currently are unable to

travel, do not have the financial resources to leave

Venezuela, or have been forced to return to Cuba. Two

applicants were unsuccessful in their attempt to leave

Venezuela from the Barcelona (Venezuela) airport. Note: Most

CMPP applicants departing from the Caracas airport have been

successful in boarding their flight to Miami. Following the

approval of parole by DHS, CMPP applicants must enter the US

within 60 days. End Note.

-------------------------------

CUBAN MEDICS CLAIM MISTREATMENT

-------------------------------

Â¶4. (C) The majority of the CMPP applicants interviewed by

Post were originally conscripted to work in social programs

such as Mission Barrio Adentro, a GBRV sponsored program that

provides health care to city slums and rural communities, or

similar GBRV poverty reduction programs in medicine, sports,

and the arts. In its annual 2008 report, the Caracas based

human rights NGO PROVEA estimated that 14,345 Cuban medical

professionals were originally assigned to work in Venezuela

following the inauguration of Barrio Adentro in December

Â¶2003. Currently only about 8,500 Cubans are estimated to be

employed in social programs across the country. While some

CMPP applicants told Consular officials they volunteered to

come to Venezuela, many others have complained of being

forced (or directed) by Cuban authorities to work in

Venezuela under President Chavez's social mission programs

for a period of 1-3 years.

CARACAS 00000442 002.2 OF 003

Â¶5. (C) Many CMPP applicants have reported that upon arrival

in Venezuela, Barrio Adentro Mission officials have

confiscated the passports of program participants to prevent

their fleeing the mission. According to one applicant who

was interviewed on January 27, 2009, the coordinator of the

Cuban medical mission (Barrio Adentro 2, Aragua state) had

been holding his and his other colleagues' passports since

April 2008, when another Cuban had abandoned the mission, as

a "means of preventing other desertions." The applicant did

not receive his passport back until he went on a scheduled

vacation in September 2008 to Cuba. Upon his return to

Venezuela in October 2008 he was not required by mission

authorities to turn over his passport a second time. The

CMPP applicant received Significant Public Benefit Parole on

March 2, 2009, was issued a YY visa foil, successfully fled

Venezuela, and arrived in Miami on March 16, 2009.

Â¶6. (C) During Consular section interviews in March, Cuban

medical personnel affiliated with Chavez's Barrio Adentro

program complained of extremely poor working conditions, low

pay, limited medical supplies, and of constantly being

watched and monitored by co-workers. According to one doctor

who successfully fled on March 10, "All the effort I put into

my work is not recognized by anyone... I am not well paid and

only make 715 BsF (332 USD) a month in Venezuela, I want to

change my life." The doctor told Consular Officers that he

is forced to attend to 250-300 patients a week and "can only

use obsolete and inferior Cuban medicine". A rehabilitation

therapist who successfully fled on March 16 opined, "I feel

politically manipulated. The system is closing my chances

and I want to be a better professional. I have a lack of

equipment and medicine in my job. I want to be a free man.

I want to be a surgeon specialist." On March 30 one CMPP

applicant, who managed to escape his mission for several

hours and was clearly anxious to return before his supervisor

realized he was gone, told Poloff "They are always watching

us, checking in with us at random times, asking what we are

doing and calling us on our cell phones." While noting that

he has not received any physical threats so far during his

time in Venezuela, he commented "It is a psychological battle

that we must endure every day."

----------------------------------------

CORRUPTION, DESPERATION, GBRV CLAMP DOWN

----------------------------------------

Â¶7. (S) The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela (GBRV) began clamping down on Cubans attempting to

flee the island via Venezuela in 2007. While many applicants

have successfully fled Cuba through Venezuela, others have

been detained upon attempting to depart and presumably

deported to Cuba. Recent asylum seekers have complained of

having to pay exorbitant bribes (usually around 1,000 USD) to

Venezuelan customs officials when attempting to exit the

country en-route to Miami.

Â¶8. (S) As recently as March 24 a Cuban couple attempted to

board a flight from Barcelona (Venezuela) to Miami after the

US Embassy issued YY visa foils for their onward travel. The

couple paid over 4,600 USD to "a contact" to assist them in

clearing GBRV immigration. After their flight was delayed and

a shift change occurred at the airport, the couple was

questioned by Venezuelan immigration authorities who turned

them over to the National Guard. The military later

contacted Cuban officials. The couple was eventually moved

to a hotel by Cuban "security" and told they would be

deported to Cuba. The CMPP applicants later escaped their

captors and fled to the US Embassy, where a local contact

picked them up and reportedly took them into hiding. The

traumatized couple told US Consular officers the Cuban

"police" who detained them were also "Barrio Adentro Mission

officials". According to the female CMPP applicant, the

"Cuban police" threatened to rape her and beat up her

boyfriend. Note: Recent CMPP applicants have reported to

Consular Officers that after leaving Barrio Adentro,

occasionally some Venezuelans are willing to help Cubans who

are in hiding. Little is known about the individuals who

assist Cuban medical personnel once they abandon Chavez's

"missions." End Note.

Â¶9. (S) Comment: Due to the risk CMPP applicants have of

being stopped by GBRV authorities prior to boarding Miami

CARACAS 00000442 003.2 OF 003

bound aircraft, some Cuban parolees have considered (or are

considering) undertaking a cross border overland trip to

Bogota. While Post does not advise parolees on which route

(if any) is less risky, the issuance of YY visa foils by Post

has reduced the probability of GBRV immigration officials

detecting a parolee prior to his or her departure. Post

believes, however, that it is only a matter of time before

GBRV immigration officials become alert to the YY visa foils

and are able to further tighten the GBRV's clamp down on

Cubans planning to abandon the social missions and flee the

country. With the February approval of 73 applicants by DHS,

(over 25 applicants have been issued YY visa foils in the

past two weeks alone), and more cases pending approval, Post

continues to meet the demand of Cuban medical personnel

hoping to flee Venezuela rather than face the prospect of

returning to Cuba. End Comment.

Fonte: www.wikileaks.ch

Le immagini ad alta risoluzione su Google Earth: OGGETTO - Potrebbero essere di aiuto ad attacchi terroristici in CINA!

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 023571

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2021

TAGS: PREL PINR TSPA CH

SUBJECT: PRC CLAIMS HIGH RESOLUTION IMAGERY ON GOOGLE EARTH

COULD AID TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CHINA

Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney.

Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY

-------

Â¶1. (C) China wants the United States Government to take action to get Google to reduce the resolution of the Google Earth images of China's military, nuclear, space, energy and other sensitive government agency installations in order to deprive terrorists of potentially dangerous information, XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX told

the DCM on XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Beijing request was

based on possible "grave consequences" if terrorists exploit

the information to harm China. Google Earth is a private

company, the DCM reminded XXXXXXXXXXXX was noncommittal on

whether China would directly contact Google or the European

imagery providers and the other sources of high resolution

imagery on the Internet. Other countries have shared similar

concerns with China, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but he refused to divulge

country names. End Summary.

Google Earth High Resolution Images a Threat to China

--------------------------------------------- --------

Â¶2. (C) Google Earth is providing high resolution images of

sensitive Chinese facilities over the Internet, thereby

endangering PRC national security, XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX told

the DCM during a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting. These facilities

include military installations, nuclear test sites, satellite

launch sites, oil production facilities, power generating

plants and important government departments. The resolution

is one meter for most of China, and is as fine as 0.6 meters

in Beijing and Shanghai, allowing anyone with Internet access

to view these facilities in great detail. Moreover, Google

Earth allows users to post information about specific

locations, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, which means information about

important Chinese agencies and sensitive installations is

effectively being published on the Internet.

"Grave Consequences" if Terrorists Use Imagery

---------------------------------------------

Â¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said China is extremely concerned that

terrorist organizations could access the high resolution

imagery and posted information and present a grave threat to

PRC national security. If terrorists used the imagery from

Google Earth to cause damage to China, there would be "grave

consequences," warned XXXXXXXXXXXX. In the spirit of our sound

bilateral cooperative relationship, particularly on

counterterrorism issues, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked that the United States

place "great importance" on China's concerns, understand the

sensitivity of the matter and take action so that Google will

reduce the resolution of the images of China's sensitive

facilities.

DCM: Google a Private Company, and Not Imagery Source

--------------------------------------------- --------

Â¶3. (C) The DCM told XXXXXXXXXXXX that he would report the request

to Washington, but noted that Google is a private company.

The DCM said he had no information to offer on what, if any,

role or response the United States Government might have to

the Chinese presentation. The DCM noted that the Chinese

points only asked for a reduction in the resolution and asked

if the Chinese sought any specific level. The DCM also asked

whether XXXXXXXXXXXX had contacted Google directly and, since

Google purchases the imagery as any individual or entity can,

whether China had contacted the satellite imagery providers.

XXXXXXXXXXXX: Other, Unspecified Countries Have Similar Concerns

--------------------------------------------- -------------

Â¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that China is approaching the United

States Government because the issue is directly relevant to

counterterrorism and that while Google is a private company

it operates in the United States "political and legal

environment." China is requesting the United States take

action to prevent the information from being misused to cause

damage to China, XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated. He offered that China

had been in discussions with other countries with similar

concerns about Google Earth. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX refused to

provide the names of the other countries, noting he was

unable to share the information due to prior agreements with

BEIJING 00023571 002 OF 002

those countries.

Europe the Source of Imagery, But Google Earth is the Key

--------------------------------------------- ------------

Â¶5. (C) China will talk to Google about the "technical

details," XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, adding that it is not for the MFA

to determine the appropriate resolution level. China knows

the source data comes from European companies, satellite

operators and the European space agency but XXXXXXXXXXXX said China

sees Google as the problem because it makes the information

easily accessible. When pressed, XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that

Beijing had not yet contacted the European providers or the

governments associated with the European space program. XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX said that while China will look at the other Internet

sources of the high resolution imagery, Google,s well known

imagery is of greatest concern.

Fonte: www.wikileaks.ch

DA WIKILEAKS - AMBASCIATA USA A ROMA - COMMENTS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND KOSOVO CREATE FIRESTORM IN ITALY!

RISERVATO Sezione 01 del 02 ROMA 001.386

SIPDIS

EO 12.958 decl: 2018/11/15

TAGS Prel, PGOV, NATO, RS, IT

OGGETTO: COMMENTI BERLUSCONIâ € ™ S sulla difesa missilistica e il Kosovo FIRESTORM CREARE IN ITALIA

ROMA 00001386 001,2 di 002

Classificato da: Barbara A. Foglia, Acting Vice Capo Missione, per i figli Rea 1.4 (b) e (d).

Â ¶1. (C) Nel corso di una conferenza stampa a margine del vertice Italia-Turchia a Izmir il 12 novembre, italiano PM Berlusconi ha detto che gli Stati Uniti avevano â € œprovokedâ €? La Russia riconosce unilateralmente l'indipendenza Kosovoâ € ™ s, premendo in avanti sulla difesa missilistica, e invitando l'Ucraina e la Georgia di avere un rapporto più stretto con la NATO. Mentre Berlusconiâ € ™ s commenti più recenti sono il culmine di una serie di osservazioni infiammatorie e inutile a sostegno di Putin che ha avuto inizio poco dopo Berlusconi si è insediato questo anno, queste ultime affermazioni è andato molto più in là nel tentativo di addossare la colpa della Russiaâ € ™ s paranoia gli Stati Uniti, inoltre, Berlusconi sembra essere incoraggiante il suo governo e la Russia di ignorare l'attuale amministrazione e la hall la futura presidente degli Stati Uniti ad adottare una linea più morbida nei confronti della Russia. Allo stesso tempo, egli ha tentato di dipingersi come l'interlocutore principale tra Putin e l'Occidente, e in particolare con gli Stati Uniti come conseguenza di Berlusconiâ € ™ s ultimi commenti, post allungò la mano per interlocutori a tutti i livelli per registrare il nostro sgomento per l'ultima raffica di Berlusconisms. I nostri contatti universalmente risposto con una combinazione di sgomento, il licenziamento o la spalla-stringendosi nelle spalle. In uno sforzo a danno di controllo, FM Frattini ha inviato un alto funzionario del MAE la mattina seguente per vedere la A / DCM e â € ~ € ™ clarifyâ il governo indiano, la posizione s. Invece, ha preso di nuovo uno stringato messaggio al FM che tali osservazioni rischio di danni sostanziali e durevoli in Italia, s credibilità a Washington. Fine riassunto.

Â ¶2. (C) Nel corso di una conferenza stampa con il turco Erdogan PM il 12 novembre a Smirne, PM Berlusconi ha detto che gli USA avevano â € œprovokedâ €? La Russia riconosce unilateralmente l'indipendenza Kosovoâ € ™ s, la pressione in avanti con Missile Defense e incoraggiando l'Ucraina e la Georgia di avere un rapporto più stretto con la NATO. Berlusconiâ € ™ s ultimi commenti rappresentano la continuazione di una lunga campagna di sostegno a Putin in quanto il PM italiano tornato al potere di quest'anno. In aggiunta alle sue ultime osservazioni, Berlusconi ha sostenuto iniziative russo a creare una nuova architettura di sicurezza in Europa per sostituire la NATO e l'OSCE, ha insistito sul fatto che Putin ha agito correttamente durante il conflitto Georgia-Russia, e si è opposto l'espansione della NATO sulla base del fatto che essa presenta una minaccia per la Russia. Egli ha anche chiesto che la Russia di essere un membro a pieno titolo dell'UE - un commento ha fatto in un momento in cui l'UE sta considerando se continuare come al solito con la Russia a seguito del conflitto Georgia-Russia.

Â ¶3. (C) La maggior parte inquietante, Berlusconi ha tentato di ritrarre se stesso per la Russia e l'UE come l'interlocutore principale tra la comunità transatlantica, e in particolare gli Stati Uniti e Russia. Egli ha ripetutamente invitato gli Stati Uniti ad adottare una linea più morbida con la Russia su quasi tutte le questioni democratiche e di sicurezza e ha persino invitato il suo governo e la Russia a guardare oltre l'attuale amministrazione per la futura presidente degli Stati Uniti, al fine di raggiungere questi obiettivi.

Â ¶4. (C) A seguito di questa ultima serie di osservazioni, abbiamo raggiunto fuori praticamente a ogni interlocutore senior Russia nel governo indiano e di Berlusconi, s propria coalizione di centro-destra. L'ambasciatore chiamato DPM Letta. A / DCM chiamato FM Frattiniâ € ™ s capo di stato maggiore, il MAE direttore generale per l'Europa, la National Security Advisor, e un membro del parlamento dal partito s Berlusconiâ € ™. Poloff allungò la mano al direttore facente funzione del MAE Ufficio Russia, il Direttore del Dipartimento di Pianificazione della sicurezza, i consiglieri diplomatici a Berlusconi e ai membri del partito s Berlusconiâ € ™. Abbiamo espresso la nostra preoccupazione che Berlusconiâ € ™ s tentativi di â € ~ € ™ dialogueâ creando con la Russia sono stati, infatti, creare una maggiore tensione e di minare gli sforzi comuni per riportare la stabilità nei Balcani, e raffigurante l'espansione di successo e pacifica della Euro- spazio atlantico come una minaccia alla Russia. In uno sforzo apparente a danno di controllo, FM Frattini ha inviato un membro anziano del suo staff, programmazione politica direttore Maurizio Massari, il giorno dopo Berlusconi, s commento alla chiamata in A / DCM di â € ~ € ™ politica clarifyâ GOI.

Â ¶5. (C) Massari (come hanno fatto quasi tutti i nostri interlocutori) ha detto A / DCM che il PM era abituato a fare off-the-bracciale osservazioni che non devono essere interpretate come dichiarazioni politiche di per sé. Massari ha detto che Frattini è stato esortando gli Stati Uniti a

ROMA 00001386 002,2 di 002

guardare al Italya € ™ s forte cooperazione bilaterale piuttosto che Berlusconiâ € ™ s commenti come un'indicazione della forza della relazione e la direzione della politica italiana. Italya € ™ s di politica estera è rimasta fortemente atlantista; Berlusconi, secondo Massari, aveva concepito per essere costruttivo e ha voluto assumere un ruolo positivo nella creazione di comprensione tra i suoi partner strategici, gli Stati Uniti e la Russia. I commenti non aveva inteso criticare gli Stati Uniti.

Â ¶6. (C) A / DCM replicato che le dichiarazioni PMA € ™ s rischia di danneggiare i nostri sforzi per portare stabilità nei Balcani, mettendo in discussione le basi per Kosovoâ € ™ s indipendenza - un processo che l'Italia era stata una parte della fin dall'inizio . Inoltre, Berlusconi, s commenti correva a capofitto nelle trattative riservate con la Russia per le misure di fiducia, così come discussioni interne ceco e polacco sulla ratifica della Missile Defense. Caratterizzando le aspirazioni NATO ucraini e georgiani in quanto tale, minaccia la Russia, Berlusconi è stato in dubbio un processo che ha prodotto significative riforme nei paesi candidati che stanno cercando di unirsi alla comunità delle nazioni democratiche.

Â ¶7. (C) A / DCM Massari ha detto che il governo indiano ha dato ad ogni aspetto che gli Stati Uniti stava vivendo un vuoto di potere. L'attuale amministrazione era ancora in carica, e quello entrante che aveva fatto abbondantemente chiaro. Incoraggiando il suo governo e la Russia a parlare passato l'attuale amministrazione e di offrire â € ~ € ™ adviceâ per il Presidente eletto, Berlusconi stava perdendo credibilità per l'Italia come un partner affidabile, che poteva permettersi di fare, date le sfide future di noi in Afghanistan e altrove. A / DCM ha aggiunto che la nuova amministrazione avrebbe condotto la sua diplomazia personale e non avrebbe bisogno di Berlusconi come â € ~ a bridgeâ € ™ di impegnarsi in un dialogo con la Russia su una base bilaterale o multilaterale.

Â ¶8. (C) Massari, in evidente disagio, ha detto che â € ~ € ™ understoodâ completamente la prospettiva degli Stati Uniti su Berlusconi, s flusso recente commento, ha detto che avrebbe preso questo messaggio al FM Frattini in dettaglio. Ha inoltre incaricato il nostro pensiero sul modo di evitare ogni ulteriore misunderstandingsâ â € ~ € ™ di questa natura. Ha detto che avrebbe raccomandato che la FM fare una dichiarazione che chiarisce Italya € ™ s di sostegno per il Kosovo e l'espansione della NATO. Ha anche detto che consigliano la FM per parlare con Berlusconi circa il grado in cui i suoi commenti sul rapporto USA Russia, Georgia, MD e altre questioni avevano irritato Washington. A / DCM terminato la conversazione lasciando intendere che i PM astenersi dal fare ulteriori offerte per guidare la nuova amministrazione americana nel suo rapporto con la Russia.

Â ¶9. (C) Commento. Tutti i nostri interlocutori erano i dolori visibili a sottolineare che hanno capito il PMA € ™ s commenti a Smirne aveva varcato la linea. Tutti, però, in particolare ai funzionari di partito, ha ribadito che Berlusconi non ascolta i consigli dei propri esperti, in lavorazione il suo approccio con altri Stati. Sulla Russia, Berlusconi prende questo ad un estremo, non solo per condurre il suo marchio di politica estera, ma su base tattica, come un modo per conquistare il favore con i suoi interlocutori russi - con la quale molti (compresi i suoi funzionari stesso partito) ha indagato un rapporto personale e finanziariamente arricchente. Tutti i nostri contatti ha dichiarato che potrebbe essere difficile per regnare in lui e, un po 'fatalisticamente, ci ha incoraggiato ad ignorare i suoi commenti. Un alto funzionario del MAE si spinse fino a suggerire l'ambasciatore affrontare la questione direttamente con Berlusconi e ci ha chiesto di farle sapere quello che Berlusconi ha offerto come la sua giustificazione per le sue osservazioni, in quanto, disse, non aveva alcuna conoscenza su ciò che aveva animato le sue osservazioni sul Kosovo e MD.

Â ¶10. (C) sarà tanto più importante che Berlusconi ei suoi consiglieri emesso un avvertimento allo stesso modo schietto riguardo la direzione di Italia, s politica in Russia durante qualsiasi bilats o pull-divagazioni a margine del prossimo vertice del G-20.

Fonte: www.wikileaks.ch

TESTO ORIGINALE: Â¶1. (C) During a press conference on the margins of the Italy-Turkey summit in Izmir on November 12, Italian PM Berlusconi said that the U.S. had â€œprovokedâ€ Russia by unilaterally recognizing Kosovoâ€™s independence, pressing forward on Missile Defense, and inviting Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship with NATO. While Berlusconiâ€™s latest comments are a culmination of a string of inflammatory and unhelpful comments in support of Putin that began shortly after Berlusconi took office this year, these latest statements went considerably further in attempting to place the blame for Russiaâ€™s paranoia on the U.S. Additionally, Berlusconi appears to be encouraging his own government and Russia to disregard the current administration and lobby the incoming U.S. President to take a softer line on Russia. At the same time, he has attempted to portray himself as the primary interlocutor between Putin and the West, and particularly with the U.S. As a result of Berlusconiâ€™s latest comments, post reached out to interlocutors at all levels to register our dismay at the latest barrage of Berlusconisms. Our contacts universally responded with a combination of dismay, dismissal or shoulder-shrugging. In an effort at damage-control, FM Frattini dispatched a senior MFA official the following morning to see the A/DCM and â€˜clarifyâ€™ the GOI,s stance. Instead, he took back a terse message to the FM that such comments risk substantial and lasting damage to Italy,s credibility in Washington. End summary.

Â¶2. (C) During a press conference with Turkish PM Erdogan on November 12 in Izmir, PM Berlusconi said the U.S. had â€œprovokedâ€ Russia by unilaterally recognizing Kosovoâ€™s independence, pressing forward with Missile Defense and encouraging Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship with NATO. Berlusconiâ€™s latest comments represent a continuation of a long campaign of support for Putin since the Italian PM returned to power this year. In addition to his latest comments, Berlusconi has supported Russian initiatives to create a new security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has insisted that Putin acted appropriately during the Georgia-Russia conflict, and has opposed NATO expansion on the basis that it presents a threat to Russia. He has even called for Russia to be a full member of the EU - a comment he made at a time when the EU was considering whether to continue business as usual with Russia in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia conflict.

Â¶3. (C) Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself to Russia and the EU as the principal interlocutor between the transatlantic community, and in particular the U.S., and Russia. He has repeatedly called on the U.S. to take a softer line with Russia on virtually all democratic and security issues and has even called on his government and Russia to look beyond the current administration to the incoming U.S. President in order to achieve these goals.

Â¶4. (C) Following this latest set of remarks, we reached out to virtually every senior interlocutor on Russia within the GOI and in Berlusconi,s own center-right coalition. The Ambassador called DPM Letta. A/DCM called FM Frattiniâ€™s chief of staff, the MFA Director General for Europe, the National Security Advisor, and a member of parliament from Berlusconiâ€™s party. Poloff reached out to the Acting Director of the MFA Russia Office, the Director of the Security Planning Department, the diplomatic advisors to Berlusconi, and members of Berlusconiâ€™s party. We expressed our concern that Berlusconiâ€™s attempts at â€˜creating dialogueâ€™ with Russia were, in fact, creating greater tension and undermining common efforts to bring stability to the Balkans, and portraying the successful and peaceful expansion of the Euro-Atlantic space as a threat to Russia. In an apparent effort at damage-control, FM Frattini sent a senior member of his staff, Policy Planning Director Maurizio Massari, the day after Berlusconi,s remarks to call on A/DCM to â€˜clarifyâ€™ GOI policy.

Â¶5. (C) Massari (as did virtually all of our interlocutors) told A/DCM that the PM was accustomed to making off-the-cuff remarks that should not be interpreted as policy statements per se. Massari said that Frattini was urging the U.S. to

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look to Italyâ€™s strong bilateral cooperation rather than Berlusconiâ€™s comments as an indication of the strength of the relationship and the direction of Italian policy. Italyâ€™s foreign policy remained strongly Atlanticist; Berlusconi, according to Massari, had meant to be constructive and wanted to take a positive role in creating understanding between its key strategic partners, the U.S. and Russia. The comments had not been meant to criticize the U.S.

Â¶6. (C) A/DCM countered that the PMâ€™s statements risked damaging to our efforts to bring stability to the Balkans by calling into question the basis for Kosovoâ€™s independence - a process that Italy had been a part of from the beginning. Additionally, Berlusconi,s comments ran headlong into sensitive negotiations with Russia on confidence building measures, as well as Czech and Polish internal deliberations on ratification of Missile Defense. By characterizing Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations as inherently threatening to Russia, Berlusconi was casting doubt on a process which had produced significant reforms in aspirant countries that are looking to join the community of democratic nations.

Â¶7. (C) A/DCM told Massari that the GOI gave every appearance that the U.S. was experiencing a power vacuum. The current administration was still in charge, and the incoming one had made that abundantly clear. By encouraging his own government and Russia to speak past the current administration and offer â€˜adviceâ€™ to the President-Elect, Berlusconi was losing credibility for Italy as a reliable partner, which he could ill afford to do, given the challenges ahead of us in Afghanistan and elsewhere. A/DCM added that the new administration would conduct its own diplomacy and would not need Berlusconi as â€˜a bridgeâ€™ to engage in a dialogue with Russia on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.

Â¶8. (C) Massari, in obvious discomfort, said he â€˜fully understoodâ€™ the U.S. perspective on Berlusconi,s recent stream of commentary, said he would take this message back to FM Frattini in detail. He also asked for our thoughts on how to avoid any further â€˜misunderstandingsâ€™ of this nature. He said he would recommend that the FM make a statement clarifying Italyâ€™s support for Kosovo and NATO expansion. He also said he would advise the FM to talk to Berlusconi about the degree to which his comments on the US/Russia relationship, Georgia, MD and other issues had irritated Washington. A/DCM ended the conversation by suggesting that PM refrain from making any further offers to guide the new U.S. administration in its relationship with Russia.

Â¶9. (C) Comment. All of our interlocutors were at visible pains to underscore that they understood the PMâ€™s comments in Izmir had crossed the line. All, however, particularly party officials, reiterated that Berlusconi does not listen to the advice of his own experts in crafting his approach with other states. On Russia, Berlusconi takes this to an extreme, not only conducting his own brand of foreign policy, but on a tactical basis, as a way of gaining favor with his Russian interlocutors - with whom many (including his own party officials) suspect he has a personally and financially enriching relationship. All of our contacts stated that it might be difficult to reign him in and, somewhat fatalistically, encouraged us to ignore his comments. One senior MFA official went so far as to suggest Ambassador take up the issue directly with Berlusconi and asked us to let her know what Berlusconi offered as his justification for his remarks, since, she said, she had no insight whatsoever as to what had animated his remarks on Kosovo and MD.

Â¶10. (C) It will be all the more important that Berlusconi and his advisors hear a similarly blunt warning about the direction of Italy,s Russia policy during in any bilats or pull-asides on the margins of the upcoming G-20 summit.

Fonte: www.wikileaks.ch