Libia - I ribelli entrano a Tripoli - Libyan rebels enter in the bunker of the Gheddafi!

Gheddafi parla alla radio: "Vittoria o morte!"

Libia: E' vicina la caduta del regime di Gheddafi?

Libia, l'assalto finale al bunker di Gheddafi!

Grandi occasioni e promozioni con gli acquisti on-line...(Viaggi, Aerei, Treni, Alberghi, Località Turistiche, Cellulari, Computer, Abbigliamento e altro ancora!)

 

http://www.dharma.gigacenter.it/

 

 Clicca sopra la foto per le offerte 

sui viaggi estivi e invernali!

Clicca sopra la foto per vedere tutte

le offerte del mese su ogni articolo! 

Clicca sopra la foto per vedere tutte

le super offerte su ugni prodotto!

Viewing cable 07ROME710, ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE...

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000710 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHAN NGO DETAINEE, 
MEPP, LEBANON, IRAN SANCTIONS, GUANTANAMO AND ABU OMAR
 
 
REF: A. STATE 36991 
     ¶B. STATE 37005 
     ¶C. STATE 41871 
     ¶D. STATE 42573 
     ¶E. ROME 625 
     ¶F. ROME 702 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 

SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF) Amb. Spogli got FM D'Alema's agreement to make a 
clear statement in support of the Athisaari plan for Kosovo 
and was told that the FM did not think he could or should 
control an Italian NGO threatening to close its hospitals in 
Afghanistan unless one of its employees was released by the 
Afghan Government.  During an April 5 tour d'horizon, the 
Ambassador and FM also discussed Iran sanctions (D'Alema said 
Italy was applying the rules thoroughly), the Middle East 
peace process (D'Alema worried the Israelis and Palestinians 
would miss an opportunity for progress), Lebanon (where 
everything but UNIFIL is at an impasse, according to the FM), 
and the Abu Omar case.  The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the 
request that Italy consider taking some Guantanamo detainees 
to help speed the closure of the facility.  D'Alema said 
trying to close Guantanamo was a noble step and that if Italy 
could help, it would try to do so (see also septel on 
Guantanamo).  End Summary. 
 
Afghanistan and Emergency Now 
----------------------------- 

¶2. (C/NF) On April 5, Ambassador Spogli and Foreign Minister 
D'Alema discussed key issues on the foreign policy agenda. 
The Ambassador raised concerns about the statements of Gino 
Strada, head of the Italian NGO Emergency Now, who was 
threatening to close his hospitals in Afghanistan unless the 
Afghan Government released one of his staff being held for 
possible terrorist affiliations.  The Amb. said such an 
unwelcome step would be punishing the Afghan people and asked 
if D'Alema could help get Strada to stop making threats. 
D'Alema replied that he had spoken with Strada, who told him 
that if his employees are going to be arrested in 
Afghanistan, he would move his operations to a country that 
doesn't arrest his staff.  D'Alema told the Amb. that all 
sides needed to show flexibility and that if the Afghan 
Government had evidence against the individual being held, it 
should be shared. D'Alema noted that Italy was grateful to 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul for helping secure Red Cross access 
to the detained individual.  Then, somewhat exasperated, he 
said, "Strada is who he is.  He runs an NGO. He is not part 
of the Italian Government.  He says they cannot work in 
Helmand without having contact with the Taliban.  He thinks 
the Taliban have the legitimate support of the people there. 
We have urged him to be prudent.  But we do not control him 
and he feels threatened."  D'Alema then said that during the 
Mastrogiacomo kidnapping the Taliban cell phones that were 
traced all had Pakistani numbers, and that if terror bosses 
could live carefree in a Pakistan that could not be 
reproached because of its alliance with the U.S., we would 
not win this war. 
 
Kosovo - Firm Support for Status 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) The Ambassador noted that the Italian position on  
the Athisaari plan for Kosovo had generated some confusion 
and that a clear statement of support would be very helpful. 
D'Alema emphatically insisted that Italy supported the 
Athisaari plan's core status provisions ("they should not be 
touched").  Italy continued to believe that some non-status 
issues, like protection of religious sites and minority 
rights, however, could still be improved.  He said there were 
two unacceptable outcomes: continuing the status quo and a 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The latter 
would tear Europe apart and pull the legal legs out from 
under the European mission to Kosovo.  He argued that a UNSCR 
was needed that would help soften the Russian position, and a 
proposal needed to be crafted for Serbia - something 
conditional with flexible rewards - that could be offered to 
Belgrade when Serbia inevitably rejects Kosovar independence. 
 Without these elements, the region could be destabilized, he 
said.  He added that Italy had been clear in its talks with 
Russia and everywhere else that it would absolutely support 
Athisaari's core status proposal without prolonging talks and 
without new negotiations.  The Ambassador asked if D'Alema 
could make a public statement to that effect.  D'Alema agreed 
to do so. 
 
Iran Sanctions - Italy in Compliance 
------------------------------------  

¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked how Iran sanctions were 
proceeding for Italy, and noted our disappointment that when 
action was taken against Bank Sepah in Italy all funds had 
already been moved.  D'Alema said the Iranians knew it was 
coming and were a step ahead, as they had been elsewhere.  He 
added that when he had spoken with Larijani early in the week 
to urge the release of the UK sailors, Larijani had protested 
vigorously about the action against Bank Sepah.  D'Alema 
asserted "we are applying the sanctions rules.  We are in 
compliance.  But Italy is also the victim of the sanctions 
and is excluded from negotiations with Iran and from the 
group with primary responsibility for decisions on Iran, 
despite being a UNSC member." 
 
Israel-Palestine: About to Miss an Opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 

¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador thanked D'Alema for his recent 
helpful comments insisting that Palestinian leaders accept 
the three Quartet conditions before Italian officials would 
meet with them.  The FM said he feared a moment of 
opportunity was being lost.  Abu Mazen was stronger than 
before but needed to find a way to get results out of his 
dialogue with Olmert.  Both sides, he said, need to be pushed 
and encouraged.  Without progress the risk of violence would 
increase.  He suggested what was needed now was a confidence 
building phase with limited ambition focusing on releasing 
prisoners, improving Palestinian quality of life, granting 
more freedom of access/movement and getting credible security 
assurances for Israel.  The Palestinians, he said, would 
never accept an independent state within provisional borders, 
because they believe this means they will never get final 
status issues resolved.  He envisions an eventual regional 
final status conference, but not until the open final status 
questions have been resolved by the two sides.  He said with 
both sides weak and lacking strategies to reach solutions, 
the international community needed to step in and offer hope 
for positive movement.  Europe should press the Palestinians 
and the U.S. should press the Israelis in a coordinated 
division of labor, he suggested, adding that the Palestinians 
needed to hear the message that when the time comes, the U.S. 
would be willing to push Israel to resolve the final status 
issues.  He informed the Amb. that Abu Mazen would be in Rome 
in the coming weeks. 

Lebanon - D'Alema Concerned 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said he was very 
concerned because the only thing working there was UNIFIL. 
Everything else was totally blocked.  Parliament was not 
meeting.  Reconstruction was at a standstill.  The economy 
was in danger.  There was no progress on the arms embargo or 
Sheba Farms.  He said the Lebanon Contact Group meeting in 
London had been a good step and hoped that the group would 
meet at the political level to help bolster UN action.  He 
also said some way had to be found to get Syrian buy-in or 
the embargo would never work. 

Guantanamo Detainees - Closure a Noble Idea 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) The Ambassador briefed D'Alema on the request for 
Italy to consider taking some of the 25 releasable Guantanamo 
detainees who could not be returned to their countries of 
origin.  D'Alema said it was a delicate issue, but the idea 
of trying to close Guantanamo was noble, and if Italy could 
find a way to help, it would.  The devil would be in 
practicalities of whether Italy could take any of the 
detainees. (See septel for PM and Min. of Interior views on 
taking Guantanamo detainees.) 

Abu Omar - Pre-emptive Letters 
------------------------------ 

¶8. (S/NF) D'Alema closed the hour-long meeting by noting that 
he had asked the Secretary if the Department could send 
something in writing to him explaining that the U.S. would 
not act on extradition requests in the Abu Omar case if 
tendered.  This, he explained, could be used pre-emptively by 
the GOI to fend off action by Italian magistrates to seek the 
extradition of the implicated Americans.  D'Alema said he 
understood that L had discussed this with the Italian 
Ambassador in Washington.Amb. Spogli explained that we were 
waiting for the constitutional court to decide on the merits 
of the case before deciding on our next steps, because Min. 
of Justice Mastella had suspended action until that court 
rendered a decision.  The FM noted that there was still the 
risk of action by the magistrates at any time.  The 
Ambassador agreed that we should work to avoid having 
extradition requests forwarded. 
SPOGLI

Fonte: http://www.wikileaks.ch

Viewing cable 07USNATO186, DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS...

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREF PTER PREL AF IT
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: RELEASE OF TALIBAN PRISONERS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 36204 B. USNATO 183 

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Anticipating reftel A, Ambassador Nuland, 
during the March 21 North Atlantic Council meeting, joined 
the UK in criticizing the evident Taliban-for-hostage 
exchange in the release of kidnapped Italian journalist 
Mastrogiacomo.  She also raised the issue separately with SYG 
de Hoop Scheffer, who will address it with PermReps in a more 
restricted forum, but is leaning toward pushing for an 
Alliance-wide hostage policy.  USNATO believes NATO consensus 
on a common policy will be hard to achieve, but the subject 
is worth discussing to raise awareness.  END SUMMARY. 

¶2.  (C) During the March 21 NAC meeting, Ambassador Nuland 
reinforced criticism by the UK Charge and noted strongly the 
intrinsic dangers of bargaining with terrorists, plus concern 
for all Allies if the Taliban thought that hostage taking was 
a route to future prisoner exchanges (ref B).  She and the UK 
Charge also asked the Secretary General and Chairman of the 
Military Committee if ISAF had been consulted over the 
process of Mastrogiacomo's release.  Both committed to 
investigate.  The Italian Charge declined to comment on how 
the journalist was freed without more details from capital, 
but expressed the Italian government's gratitude to Karzai 
for his help. 
 
¶3.  (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer told PermReps during the March 
21 NAC that he intends to raise this issue at an informal 
lunch or coffee gathering of PermReps in the near future.  In 
a separate conversation with Ambassador Nuland, he said he is 
leaning toward pushing for an Alliance-wide hostage policy. 
 
¶4.  (C) COMMENT: Raising awareness on this issue among NATO 
Allies is important and necessary, with the goal of reaching 
agreed guidelines.  However, achieving consensus on a binding 
NATO hostage policy, similar to NSPD 12, for example, will be 
very difficult.  Few Allies are likely to want a discussion 
like this which they consider sovereign to be collectively 
decided.  END COMMENT. 
NULAND

Fonte: http://www.wikileaks.ch/

WikiLeaks Reveals Secret Files on All Guantánamo Prisoners...

In its latest release of classified US documents, WikiLeaks is shining the light of truth on a notorious icon of the Bush administration’s "War on Terror" — the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, which opened on January 11, 2002, and remains open under President Obama, despite his promise to close the much-criticized facility within a year of taking office.

In thousands of pages of documents dating from 2002 to 2008 and never seen before by members of the public or the media, the cases of the majority of the prisoners held at Guantánamo — 765 out of 779 in total — are described in detail in memoranda from JTF-GTMO, the Joint Task Force at Guantánamo Bay, to US Southern Command in Miami, Florida.

These memoranda, known as Detainee Assessment Briefs (DABs), contain JTF-GTMO’s recommendations about whether the prisoners in question should continue to be held, or should be released (transferred to their home governments, or to other governments). They consist of a wealth of important and previously undisclosed information, including health assessments, for example, and, in the cases of the majority of the 172 prisoners who are still held, photos (mostly for the first time ever).

They also include information on the first 201 prisoners released from the prison, between 2002 and 2004, which, unlike information on the rest of the prisoners (summaries of evidence and tribunal transcripts, released as the result of a lawsuit filed by media groups in 2006), has never been made public before. Most of these documents reveal accounts of incompetence familiar to those who have studied Guantánamo closely, with innocent men detained by mistake (or because the US was offering substantial bounties to its allies for al-Qaeda or Taliban suspects), and numerous insignificant Taliban conscripts from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Beyond these previously unknown cases, the documents also reveal stories of the 399 other prisoners released from September 2004 to the present day, and of the seven men who have died at the prison.

The memos are signed by the commander of Guantánamo at the time, and describe whether the prisoners in question are regarded as low, medium or high risk. Although they were obviously not conclusive in and of themselves, as final decisions about the disposition of prisoners were taken at a higher level, they represent not only the opinions of JTF-GTMO, but also the Criminal Investigation Task Force, created by the Department of Defense to conduct interrogations in the "War on Terror," and the BSCTs, the behavioral science teams consisting of psychologists who had a major say in the "exploitation" of prisoners in interrogation.

Crucially, the files also contain detailed explanations of the supposed intelligence used to justify the prisoners’ detention. For many readers, these will be the most fascinating sections of the documents, as they seem to offer an extraordinary insight into the workings of US intelligence, but although many of the documents appear to promise proof of prisoners’ association with al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, extreme caution is required.

The documents draw on the testimony of witnesses — in most cases, the prisoners’ fellow prisoners — whose words are unreliable, either because they were subjected to torture or other forms of coercion (sometimes not in Guantánamo, but in secret prisons run by the CIA), or because they provided false statements to secure better treatment in Guantánamo.

Regular appearances throughout these documents by witnesses whose words should be regarded as untrustworthy include the following "high-value detainees" or "ghost prisoners". Please note that "ISN" and the numbers in brackets following the prisoners’ names refer to the short "Internment Serial Numbers" by which the prisoners are or were identified in US custody:

Abu Zubaydah (ISN 10016), the supposed "high-value detainee" seized in Pakistan in March 2002, who spent four and a half years in secret CIA prisons, including facilities in Thailand and Poland. Subjected to waterboarding, a form of controlled drowning, on 83 occasions in CIA custody August 2002, Abu Zubaydah was moved to Guantánamo with 13 other "high-value detainees" in September 2006.

Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (ISN 212), the emir of a military training camp for which Abu Zubaydah was the gatekeeper, who, despite having his camp closed by the Taliban in 2000, because he refused to allow it to be taken over by al-Qaeda, is described in these documents as Osama bin Laden’s military commander in Tora Bora. Soon after his capture in December 2001, al-Libi was rendered by the CIA to Egypt, where, under torture, he falsely confessed that al-Qaeda operatives had been meeting with Saddam Hussein to discuss obtaining chemical and biological weapons. Al-Libi recanted this particular lie, but it was nevertheless used by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Al-Libi was never sent to Guantánamo, although at some point, probably in 2006, the CIA sent him back to Libya, where he was imprisoned, and where he died, allegedly by committing suicide, in May 2009.

Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj (ISN 1457), a Yemeni, also known as Riyadh the Facilitator, who was seized in a house raid in Pakistan in February 2002, and is described as "an al-Qaeda facilitator." After his capture, he was transferred to a torture prison in Jordan run on behalf of the CIA, where he was held for nearly two years, and was then held for six months in US facilities in Afghanistan. He was flown to Guantánamo in September 2004.

Sanad Yislam al-Kazimi (ISN 1453), a Yemeni, who was seized in the UAE in January 2003, and then held in three secret prisons, including the "Dark Prison" near Kabul and a secret facility within the US prison at Bagram airbase. In February 2010, in the District Court in Washington D.C., Judge Henry H. Kennedy Jr. granted the habeas corpus petition of a Yemeni prisoner, Uthman Abdul Rahim Mohammed Uthman, largely because he refused to accept testimony produced by either Sharqawi al-Hajj or Sanad al-Kazimi. As he stated, "The Court will not rely on the statements of Hajj or Kazimi because there is unrebutted evidence in the record that, at the time of the interrogations at which they made the statements, both men had recently been tortured."

Others include Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (ISN 10012) and Walid bin Attash (ISN 10014), two more of the "high-value detainees" transferred into Guantánamo in September 2006, after being held in secret CIA prisons.

Other unreliable witnesses, held at Guantánamo throughout their detention, include:

Yasim Basardah (ISN 252), a Yemeni known as a notorious liar. As the Washington Post reported in February 2009, he was given preferential treatment in Guantánamo after becoming what some officials regarded as a significant informant, although there were many reasons to be doubtful. As the Post noted, "military officials ... expressed reservations about the credibility of their star witness since 2004," and in 2006, in an article for the National Journal, Corine Hegland described how, after a Combatant Status Review Tribunal at which a prisoner had taken exception to information provided by Basardah, placing him at a training camp before he had even arrived in Afghanistan, his personal representative (a military official assigned instead of a lawyer) investigated Basardah’s file, and found that he had made similar claims against 60 other prisoners in total. In January 2009, in the District Court in Washington D.C., Judge Richard Leon (an appointee of George W. Bush) excluded Basardah’s statements while granting the habeas corpus petition of Mohammed El-Gharani, a Chadian national who was just 14 years old when he was seized in a raid on a mosque in Pakistan. Judge Leon noted that the government had "specifically cautioned against relying on his statements without independent corroboration," and in other habeas cases that followed, other judges relied on this precedent, discrediting the "star witness" still further.

Mohammed al-Qahtani (ISN 063), a Saudi regarded as the planned 20th hijacker for the 9/11 attacks, was subjected to a specific torture program at Guantánamo, approved by defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. This consisted of 20-hour interrogations every day, over a period of several months, and various other "enhanced interrogation techniques," which severely endangered his health. Variations of these techniques then migrated to other prisoners in Guantánamo (and to Abu Ghraib), and in January 2009, just before George W. Bush left office, Susan Crawford, a retired judge and a close friend of Dick Cheney and David Addington, who was appointed to oversee the military commissions at Guantánamo as the convening authority, told Bob Woodward that she had refused to press charges against al-Qahtani, because, as she said, "We tortured Qahtani. His treatment met the legal definition of torture." As a result, his numerous statements about other prisoners must be regarded as worthless.

Abd al-Hakim Bukhari (ISN 493), a Saudi imprisoned by al-Qaeda as a spy, who was liberated by US forces from a Taliban jail before being sent, inexplicably, to Guantánamo (along with four other men liberated from the jail) is regarded in the files as a member of al-Qaeda, and a trustworthy witness.

Abd al-Rahim Janko (ISN 489), a Syrian Kurd, tortured by al-Qaeda as a spy and then imprisoned by the Taliban along with Abd al-Hakim Bukhari, above, is also used as a witness, even though he was mentally unstable. As his assessment in June 2008 stated, "Detainee is on a list of high-risk detainees from a health perspective ... He has several chronic medical problems. He has a psychiatric history of substance abuse, depression, borderline personality disorder, and prior suicide attempt for which he is followed by behavioral health for treatment."

These are just some of the most obvious cases, but alert readers will notice that they are cited repeatedly in what purports to be the government’s evidence, and it should, as a result, be difficult not to conclude that the entire edifice constructed by the government is fundamentally unsound, and that what the Guantánamo Files reveal, primarily, is that only a few dozen prisoners are genuinely accused of involvement in terrorism.

The rest, these documents reveal on close inspection, were either innocent men and boys, seized by mistake, or Taliban foot soldiers, unconnected to terrorism. Moreover, many of these prisoners were actually sold to US forces, who were offering bounty payments for al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects, by their Afghan and Pakistani allies — a policy that led ex-President Musharraf to state, in his 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, that, in return for handing over 369 terror suspects to the US, the Pakistani government “earned bounty payments totalling millions of dollars.”

Uncomfortable facts like these are not revealed in the deliberations of the Joint Task Force, but they are crucial to understanding why what can appear to be a collection of documents confirming the government’s scaremongering rhetoric about Guantánamo — the same rhetoric that has paralyzed President Obama, and revived the politics of fear in Congress — is actually the opposite: the anatomy of a colossal crime perpetrated by the US government on 779 prisoners who, for the most part, are not and never have been the terrorists the government would like us to believe they are.

(Andy Worthington)

How to Read WikiLeaks’ Guantánamo Files

Prigionieri a Guantanamo

The nearly 800 documents in WikiLeaks’ latest release of classified US documents are memoranda from Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO), the combined force in charge of the US "War on Terror" prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to US Southern Command, in Miami, Florida, regarding the disposition of the prisoners.

Written between 2002 and 2008, the memoranda were all marked as "secret," and their subject was whether to continue holding a prisoner, or whether to recommend his release (described as his "transfer" — to the custody of his own government, or that of some other government). They were obviously not conclusive in and of themselves, as final decisions about the disposition of prisoners were taken at a higher level, but they are very significant, as they represent not only the opinions of JTF-GTMO, but also the Criminal Investigation Task Force, created by the Department of Defense to conduct interrogations in the "War on Terror," and the BSCTs, the behavioral science teams consisting of psychologists who had a major say in the "exploitation" of prisoners in interrogation.

Under the heading, "JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment," the memos generally contain nine sections, describing the prisoners as follows, although the earlier examples, especially those dealing with prisoners released — or recommended for release — between 2002 and 2004, may have less detailed analyses than the following:

1. Personal information

Each prisoner is identified by name, by aliases, which the US claims to have identified, by place and date of birth, by citizenship, and by Internment Serial Number (ISN). These long lists of numbers and letters — e.g. US9YM-000027DP — are used to identify the prisoners in Guantánamo, helping to dehumanize them, as intended, by doing away with their names. The most significant section is the number towards the end, which is generally shortened, so that the example above would be known as ISN 027. In the files, the prisoners are identified by nationality, with 47 countries in total listed alphabetically, from "az" for Afghanistan to "ym" for Yemen.

2. Health

This section describes whether or not the prisoner in question has mental health issues and/or physical health issues. Many are judged to be in good health, but there are some shocking examples of prisoners with severe mental and/or physical problems.

3. JTF-GTMO Assessment

a. Under "Recommendation," the Task Force explains whether a prisoner should continue to be held, or should be released. b. Under "Executive Summary," the Task Force briefly explains its reasoning, and, in more recent cases, also explains whether the prisoner is a low, medium or high risk as a threat to the US and its allies and as a threat in detention (i.e. based on their behavior in Guantánamo), and also whether they are regarded as of low, medium or high intelligence value. c. Under "Summary of Changes," the Task Force explains whether there has been any change in the information provided since the last appraisal (generally, the prisoners are appraised on an annual basis).

4. Detainee’s Account of Events

Based on the prisoners’ own testimony, this section puts together an account of their history, and how they came to be seized, in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere, based on their own words.

5. Capture Information

This section explains how and where the prisoners were seized, and is followed by a description of their possessions at the time of capture, the date of their transfer to Guantánamo, and, spuriously, "Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO," which lists alleged reasons for the prisoners’ transfer, such as knowledge of certain topics for exploitation through interrogation. The reason that this is unconvincing is because, as former interrogator Chris Mackey (a pseudonym) explained in his book The Interrogators, the US high command, based in Camp Doha, Kuwait, stipulated that every prisoner who ended up in US custody had to be transferred to Guantánamo — and that there were no exceptions; in other words, the "Reasons for transfer" were grafted on afterwards, as an attempt to justify the largely random rounding-up of prisoners.

6. Evaluation of Detainee’s Account

In this section, the Task Force analyzes whether or not they find the prisoners’ accounts convincing.

7. Detainee Threat

This section is the most significant from the point of view of the supposed intelligence used to justify the detention of prisoners. After "Assessment," which reiterates the conclusion at 3b, the main section, "Reasons for Continued Detention," may, at first glance, look convincing, but it must be stressed that, for the most part, it consists of little more than unreliable statements made by the prisoners’ fellow prisoners — either in Guantánamo, or in secret prisons run by the CIA, where torture and other forms of coercion were widespread, or through more subtle means in Guantánamo, where compliant prisoners who were prepared to make statements about their fellow prisoners were rewarded with better treatment. Some examples are available on the homepage for the release of these documents: http://wikileaks.ch/gitmo/

With this in mind, it should be noted that there are good reasons why Obama administration officials, in the interagency Guantánamo Review Task Force established by the President to review the cases of the 241 prisoners still held in Guantánamo when he took office, concluded that only 36 could be prosecuted.

The final part of this section, "Detainee’s Conduct," analyzes in detail how the prisoners have behaved during their imprisonment, with exact figures cited for examples of "Disciplinary Infraction."

8. Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment

After reiterating the intelligence assessment at 3b and recapping on the prisoners’ alleged status, this section primarily assesses which areas of intelligence remain to be "exploited," according to the Task Force.

9. EC Status

The final section notes whether or not the prisoner in question is still regarded as an "enemy combatant," based on the findings of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, held in 2004-05 to ascertain whether, on capture, the prisoners had been correctly labeled as "enemy combatants." Out of 558 cases, just 38 prisoners were assessed as being "no longer enemy combatants," and in some cases, when the result went in the prisoners’ favor, the military convened new panels until it got the desired result.

Fonte: http://www.wikileaks.ch/

L'allarme dell'intelligence: "Presto un attacco chimico di Al Qaida agli Usa!"

Gli Stati Uniti temono che Al Qaida stia progettando di fabbricare armi chimiche da utilizzare per attentati in territorio americano, accumulando grandi quantita' di semi di ricino e lavorandoli in laboratori segreti nello Yemen per estrarne la micidiale ricina. E' quanto scrive oggi il New York Times, che cita fonti di intelligence Usa.

Secondo alcuni documenti classificati, da oltre un anno Al Qaida nella Penisola arabica (Aqpa), il braccio yemenita del network del terrore creato da Osama bin Laden, sta trasportando segretamente semi di ricino in laboratori nella provincia di Shabwa, regione tribale del sud dello Yemen dove gli insorti integralisti controllano vaste zone. Secondo i timori dell' amministrazione Usa, l'intenzione dei terroristi e' di produrre la polvere di ricina e di impacchettarla in piccole bombe capaci di diffondere il veleno.

'Non e' difficile produrre ricina', spiega al Nyt Michael E. Leiter, fino a poco tempo fa direttore del National Counterterrorism Center, anche se gli esperti spiegano che non mancano le difficolta' tecniche. La tossina, dicono le fonti al giornale Usa, perde facilmente le sue micidiali proprieta' in condizioni climatiche calde e asciutte, come sono quelle dello Yemen. Inoltre la ricina, spiegano, non e' facilmente assorbibile dalla pelle, come lo sono invece altri veleni.

Ma la minaccia e' temibile e per contrastarla, dice il Nyt, l'intelligence Usa lavora fianco a fianco con quella saudita e con cio' che resta di quella yemenita.

 

Fonte: http://affaritaliani.libero.it/